
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Estimates of Soviet Medium and Heavy Tanks in Active Units Stationed in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)

Secret

SR SP 74-3 May 1974

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24 May 1974

MEMORANDUM

Estimates of Soviet Medium and Heavy Tanks in Active Units Stationed in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)

1. DIA in coordination with CIA has been conducting an intensive reassessment concerning the number, type, location, and estimated subordination of medium and heavy tanks with Soviet forces in the NGA. Based on this analysis, we have raised our estimate of the total number of Soviet tanks in the NGA by about 500. The main factor which led to this increased estimate is our belief that the increase in numbers of tanks per division, which had been under way for the past 4 to 5 years has now been almost completed. Our previous estimate had assumed that only part of the divisions had been affected by the increases.

Stet defer to -DIA re: delete

This memorandum was produced jointly by the CIA Office of Strategic Research and the DIA Soviet/

<u>Wassaw Pact Area Division</u>. It is issued as part of a continuing CIA/DIA effort to improve the data base on Warsaw Pact manpower in support of the MBFR negotiations.

2. The current joint estimates are summarized below:

	Current Estimate* (Rounded)	Previous Estimate (Rounded)
Soviet tanks in:		•
East Germany Poland Czechoslovakia	7100 650 1330	6800 600 1200
	9100	8600
Tanks with Indigenous Forces	: 6900	6900
TOTAL NGA:	16000	15500

3. CIA and DIA intend to update these estimates on a quarterly basis with the next update scheduled for release on 1 July 1974.

^{*} Because of rounding, components may not add to total shown.

NATO Guidelines Area -- Soviet Medium and Heavy Tanks in Active Units: Numbers, Type, Location and Estimated Subordination

Summary Table

	Soviet Stationed Force	Number of Tanks* (Estimates Rounded)	by '	of Tanks Type* s Rounded)	
,	GSFG	7100	3060 3340 220 	T-62 T-54/55 T-10 JS/JSU U/I	- · · · · ·
SEGRET	NGF	650	325 325	T-62 T-54/55	SECRET
ÆT -	CGF	1330	900 430	T-62 T-54/55	E
	Total NGA	9100	4300 4100 220 190 290	T-62 T-54/55 T-10 JS/JSU U/I	

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^{*} Because of rounding, components may not add to total show.

NATO Guidelines Area -- Soviet Medium and Heavy Tanks in Active Units: Numbers, Type, Location and Estimated Subordination 1/

		Unit	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tanks	
	GSFG					•
		Berlin Sec. Bde. Tk Bn	Berlin/Karlshorst 261 Garz 201	120 31	T-54/55 U/I	
SECRET		Trng. Related Tk Trng Regt MR Trng Regt MR Trng Regt MR Trng Regt	Juterbog 207 - Juterbog 207 Juterbog 207 Juterbog 207 Altengrabow 207 Altengrabow 201/204 Cottbus 282 Mahlwinkel 234	95 95 95 126 126 40	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-62, T-54/55, T-10 <u>2/</u> T-54/55, T-10 <u>3/</u> T-54/55 T-62	SECRET
		Total Trng Related Total, GSFG Hqs. Su	bordinate	617 768 (770	Rnd)	
		lst Gds. Tank Army Hvy TR	Langensalza 231	95	JS	
	, .	6th Gds. TO 53 GTP. U/I TR 52 GTR (200) MRC	Wittenberg 283 Wittenberg 283 Wittenberg 284 Juterbog AB 206	325	T-62 T-34/55 T-62 T-54/55	•

	Unit	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tanks
	7th Gds. TD U/I TR 55 GTR 56 GTR (23) MRR	Dessau Kochstadt 241 Rosslau 201 Zerbst AB 221 Bernburg 241	325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
SECRET	9th Tank Div. 95 TR 23 TR 70 TR 8 MRR	Meissen 202 Zeithain AB 201 Zeithain AB 201 Zeithain AB 201	325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
PET -	llth Gds. Tank Div. 7 TR 44 GTR 40 GTR 27 GMRR	Konigsbruck AB 224 Konigsbruck AB 221 Konigsbruck AB 223 Dresden AB 208	325	T-62, T-54/55 4/ T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
	27th Gds. MRD (69) GMRR (70) GMRR 68 GMRR 28 GTR U/I Tk Bn	Halle AB 203 Halle AB 203 Halle AB 201 Halle AB 201 Halle AB 201	255	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55
	Total 1st Gds. Ta	nk Army	1650 (1650 Rnd	<u>i)</u>

<u>Unit</u>	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tanks
2nd Gds. Army			
Hvy Tank Regt.	Schwerin 246	31	JSU
	Ludwigslust 262/266	31	JS!!
	Hagenow 261	35	
Tank Figh.	Rathenow 241	n ŋ.	U/I
9th Gds. Tank Div.	-	325	
U/I TR	Gustrow AB 246		T-62
47 GTR	Neustrelitz 221		T-62
65 GTR	- Neustrelitz 221		
33 GMRR	Furstenberg 283		T-54/55
32nd MR Div.		255	T-54/55 SH CP T-62 T-62 H
283 MRR	Hagenow AB 261		т-62
58 MRR	Perleberg 241		т-62 /∺
59 MRR	Ludwigslust 261		т-62
33 TR	Parchim 221/222		T-54/55
U/I Tk Bn	Ludwigslust 262		U/I
94th Gds. MR Div.		255	
	Schwerin 242/243		T-54/55
U/I MRR	Schwerin 241		T-54/55
286 GMRR	Wismar 241		T-54/55
288 GMRR	Schwerin 242/243		T-54/55
(74) TR	unlocated		U/I
U/I Tk Bn	uniocatea		0/1
Total 2nd Gds. A	rmy .	1027 (1025 Rn	<u>a)</u>

	Unit		Number	
	- 	Location	of Tanks	Type of Tank
	3rd Shock Army			
	Hvy Tank Regt.	Gardelegen 202	31	T-10
		Stendal 284	31	T-10
		Hillersleben 287	31	T-10
	Tank Unit	Quedlinburg 203	71	T-54/55, T-10 <u>5</u> /
	10th Gds. Tank Div.	·	325	
	62 GTR	Potsdam 288		T-62
	63 GTR	Potsdam 287	•	T-62
	U/I TR	Krampnitz 261		T-62
	29 GMRR	Krampnitz 261		T_62
SECRET				<u>બ</u>
Ä	' 12th Gds. Tank Div.		325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
∌	→ 48 GTR	Neuruppin 205		T-62 42
Æ	ı 66 TR	Neuruppin 205		T-62
/∹	U/Ì TR	Neuruppin 205		T-62
1	U/I MRR	Unlocated $\underline{6}/$		U/I / ,
	25th Tank Div.		325	
	111 TR	Templin 223		T-62
	175 TR	Prenzlau 241/242		T-62
	(83) TR	Prenzlau 241/242		T-62
	20 MRR	Furstenberg 281		T-62
	47th Gds. Tank Div.		325	
	26 GTR	Hillersleben 283		T-62
	U/I TR	Hillersleben 286		T-62
	(64) GTR	Halberstadt 273		T-54/55
	(64) GTR (62) GMRR	Magdeburg 283/284		T-54/55
	(02) 0111(1)	- ·		

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			- + + + · · · ·		Number	m (m)	
		Unit	Location	1	of Tanks	Type of Tank	
		207th MR Div. 597 MRR 598 MRR	Burg 262 Gardelegen 201		255	T-54/55 T-62	
	·	594 MRR 16 TR U/I Tk Bn	Stendal 281 Borgitz 242 Gardelegen 201		·	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	
		Total 3rd Shock A	rmy		<u>1719 (1720 F</u>	Rnd)	
/		8th Gds. Army Hvy Tank Bn.	Plauen_241		31	т-10	
SE/	1	20th Gds. Tank Div.	•		325		E
SECRET	1 , ®	U/I TR U/I TR U/I TR	Saalfeld 281 Weimar 202/203 Jena 221			T-62 T-62 T-62	SECRET
		U/I MRR	Weimar 202/203			T-54/55	
		20th Gds. MR Div. 19 GMRR 20 GMRR 21 GMRR 1 GTR U/I Tk Unit	Plauen 242 Wurzen 281 Grimma 201/202 Glauchau 261 Plauen 241		255	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	
		39th Gds. MR Div. 112 GMRR	Gotha 281		255	r-54/55	
		120 GMRR 117 GMRR (15) TR	Ohrdruf 221 Meiningen 201 Ohrdruf 221			T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	
		U/I Tk Bn	Meiningen 202			T-54/55	

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		Unit	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tank	
		57th Gds. MR Div. 172 GMRR 174 GMRR 170 GMRR 17 GTR U/I Tk Bn	Leipzig 241 Weissenfels 221 Naumburg 281/282 Zeitz 241/242 Arnstadt 211 <u>7</u> /	255	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 U/I	
		Total 8th Gds. A	Army	1121 (1120	Rnd)	
SEC	ı	20th Gds. MR Army Tank Bn.	Doberitz 261 <u>8</u> /	40	T-54/55	94 24 24 25
SECRET	9	6th Gds. MR Div. 16 GMRR 17 GMRR 35 GMRR 68 GTR 10 Ind Tk Bn	Bad Freienwalde Eberswalde 241 Bernau 241 Bernau 244 Karlshorst 466	2,55	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	SECRET
		14th Gds. MR Div. 69 MRR 49 GMRR 47 GMRR 10 GTR	Wuensdorf 214 Juterbog 202 Juterbog 205 Juterbog 202 Wuensdorf 214	255	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	

		<u>Unit</u>	Location	Number of Tanks Typ	e of Tank
<i>पु</i>	ſ	35th MR Div. U/I MRR 64 MRR 63 GMRR 219 TR U/I Tk Bn	Doberitz 263/583 Doberitz 265/571 Doberitz 275/268/570 Doberitz 263	255	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55
	10 -	Total 20th Gds.	. MR Army	305 (800 Rnd)	
/-3		Total GEEG		7090 (7100 Rnd): 3060 (3060 Rnd) 3335 (3340 ") 217 (220 ") 192 (190 ") 286 (290 ")	T-62 T-54/55 T-10 JS/JSU U/I

		Uni	<u> </u>	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tank	
		NGF	•		•		
SECE	- 11	20th TD U/I TR 8 TR 80 TR 7 MRR	Sw Sw	ietoszow 201 ietoszow 201 ietoszow 201 traze 210	325	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55	SECRET
# H	ł	35th GTD U/I TR U/I TR U/I TR U/I MRR	Bo Bo	rne 203 rne 201 rne 201 rne 201	325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62	ÆT.
		Tota	l NGF		650 (650 325 (325		

	Unit	Location	Number of Tanks	Type of Tank
	CGF			
SECRET	U/I GMRD U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I TR	Mlada Boleslav Zakupy 201 9/ Bohosudov 201 9/ Straz P. Ralskem 201	197	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
	U/I TD U/I TR U/I TR U/I TR U/I TR U/I MRR	Milovice 201 Milovice 201 Milovice 201 Milovice 201	325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62
	U/I Corps N 31 TD 1 237 TR U/I TR 100 TR 322 MRR	Bruntal 201 Mesto Libava 201 Krnov 201 Frenstat 201 Olomouc 208	325	T-62 T-62 T-62 T-62 T-54/55
	30 GMRD U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I TR	Ruzomberok 201 Jelsava 201 Komarno 201 Oremov Laz 201	215	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55
	48th MRD U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I MRR U/I TR U/I ITB	Ceska Trebova 202 Rokytnice V. Orlicky 201 Vysoke Myto 205 Sumperk 201 Sumperk 201	266	T-54/55 T-54/55 T-54/55 T-62 T-54/55
	Total U/I Corps		806 (800 Rnd) 1328 (1330 Rnd)	: 902 (900 knd) T-62 426 (430 Rnd) T-54/55

NATO Guidelines Area -- Soviet Medium and Heavy Tanks in Active Units: Numbers, Type, Location and Estimated Subordination

Footnotes

- Except as noted, the estimated T/E for tank and motorized rifle divisions displayed in these tables credits tank regiments with 95 tanks, motorized rifle regiments with 40 tanks and independent tank battalions (ITB) with 40 tanks.
- 2/ This unit estimated to contain 31 T-62, 64 T-54/55 medium tanks and 31 T-10 heavy tanks.
- 3/ This unit estimated to contain 95 T-54/55 medium tanks and 31 T-10 heavy tanks.
- 4/ This regiment estimated to contain 64 T-62 and 31 T-54/55 medium tanks.
- $\frac{5}{2}$ This unit estimated to contain 40 T-54/55 medium tanks and 31 T-10 heavy tanks.
- 6/ CIA believes this regiment is located in the Neuruppin/Zechlin area.
- 7/ DIA carries this ITB as unlocated.
- 8/ DIA carries this ITB as subordinate to the 35th MR Div.
- 9/ These battalions are assessed at 31 tanks each.
- 10/ This ITB is estimated to contain 51 tanks.

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JOINT MEMORANDUM

REVISED CIA/DIA ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

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SR SP 73-1 December 1973

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
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Revised CIA/DIA Estimates of Warsaw Pact Manpower in the NATO Guidelines Area

- l. Based on new evidence on the aggregate strengths of some Warsaw Pact force elements in the NATO Guidelines Area, and using improved methods for estimating strengths of other elements of the Pact forces, CIA and DIA have jointly reassessed Pact manpower in the NGA. The results of this reassessment are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. This memorandum discusses the changed estimates which have resulted from the reassessment of air and national air defense forces and the confidence levels attached to these estimates. It also identifies some major problems with the data—notably the categorization by uniformed service—and discusses alternative categorization schemes.
- 2. We have increased our estimate of overall Pact manpower in the NGA from 1,040,000 to some 1,130,000. (See Table 1). The ground forces total is increased slightly from 925,000 to an estimated 927,000 and the air forces from 112,000 to about 202,000. All of the changes on Table 1 result from higher estimates of air forces and national air defense forces and from redefinition of certain categories of forces. A notable example occurs with the apparent decrease in East German ground forces of about 10,000 men. This results from a determination that East German SAM troops and other ground-based national air defense elements should be counted with the air force total rather than the ground force total.

This memorandum was produced jointly by the CIA Office of Strategic Research and the DIA Soviet/Warsaw Pact Area Division. It is issued as part of a continuing CIA/DIA effort to improve the data base on Warsaw Pact manpower in support of the MBFR negotiations.

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Increased Estimates for Air Force and National Air Defense Personnel

3. The changed estimates of <u>Pact air and air defense</u> new informaforce personnel in NGA result from tion and refinements in the estimative analysis which now accounts for personnel involved in rear services overhead type activity. These revised estimates account for all of the changes reflected in Table 1.

4.	The n	ew info	rmation	serves	two pu	rposes.	First,
it helps	to di	spel th	e conver	ntional	belief	that th	e Pact
can suppo	ort la	rge air	and air	defen	se forc	es with	an
extremely	v low	ratio o	f suppor	t to co	ombat p	ersonnel	

Ground Force Manpower Estimate

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6. The 2,000 increase in the estimate of ground force personnel is a result of revised estimates of ground elements of national air defense forces. Otherwise, we have no basis for changing our current estimate of Warsaw Pact ground forces manpower. It should be pointed out that for MBFR purposes estimates of Pact military manpower do not include personnel in internal security and border guard functions. In the NGA these paramilitary forces comprise about 120,000 to 175,000 indigenous personnel. Some elements of these forces are equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers and possess combat capability approaching that of regular ground forces.

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Table 1

Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA $\underline{1}/$

	New Estimate			Previous Estimate		
	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Total	Ground Forces	Air Forces	Total
Soviet:						
GSFG NGF CGF Total*	360,000 30,000 70,000 460,000	40,800 13,700 5,600 60,100	400,800 43,700 75,600 520,000	360,000 30,000 70,000 460,000	36,500 15,000 5,000 56,500	396,500 45,000 75,000 517,000
Indigenous						•
East Germany Poland Czechoslovakia Total*	$\begin{array}{r} 90 - 400 - 27 - \\ 219 + 100 \overline{3} / \\ 157 + 900 \overline{3} / \\ 467 + 000 \end{array}$	38,300 60,500 42,900 142,000	279,600 200,800 609,000	100,000 210,000 155,000 465,000	12,000 25,000 18,000 55,000	112,000 235,000 173,000 520,000
Total NGA *	927,000	202,000	1,130,000	925,000	112,000	1,040,000

^{1.} Includes all uniformed Pact military personnel on active duty in NGA, including national air defense personnel. Does not include naval personnel, personnel in reserves, territorial defense forces, or other paramilitary organizations.

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Does not include elements of the Air and Air Defense Command which are shown in East German Air Force total.

^{3.} Includes SAM, AAA and some radar personnel of the respective air defense commands.

^{*} These totals have been rounded to three significant digits.



Confidence Factor in the Revised Estimates

- 7. As a result of the new information and improved methodologies our confidence in the accuracy of the new estimates of Pact military personnel in the NGA is higher than that held in the old estimates.
- In percentage terms, confidence in the estimates of personnel involved in operational or direct support activity is high--the estimate is not expected to vary from the actual by more than ten percent. Confidence in estimates of personnel involved in headquarters, rear services, and army and front level support vary from 15 to 25 percent depending on the force element involved. The greatest area of uncertainty continues to be the number of personnel in such national overhead elements as defense ministries, military academies and schools, and various administrative, medical, and central support units. Estimates of these overhead elements we assign a confidence level of +-25%. These levels of uncertainty apply even in those cases where reliable aggregate information is available, because of the remaining uncertainty concerning the composition of the various sub-elements of the respective forces.
- 9. Considering the varying confidence levels attaching to the manpower estimates in these categories of military activity and their respective impact on the total figures for the indigenous East European forces in NGA, the totals shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are confidently judged to be within 15 percent of the actual current numbers. Because the Soviet forces stationed in NGA do not include a large overhead establishment, the Soviet total can be confidently judged to be within ten percent of actual.

The Problem of Categorization by Uniform Service

- 10. The data presented in Table 1 are organized to fit into a two-service mold to ease comparison with NATO concepts of uniform service.
- 11. Generally speaking, the distinctions drawn between uniform services in Pact military forces are not as sharply drawn as in US forces. This complicates the intelligence task of estimating personnel by service.

Moreover, the service responsibility for certain functions—notably tactical air support and tactical and strategic air defense—varies from country to country both in the Pact and NATO.

- 12. The most serious problem of interpretation raised by the two-service format relates to those personnel involved in national air defense. Table 2 below presents the numbers of personnel estimated to be involved in national air defense in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and indicates how these personnel are counted in the totals given in Table 1. The national air defense personnel in Poland and Czechoslovakia are organized in a distinct command. Accordingly the two-service breakdown is misleading, and may not be acceptable to the Pact negotiators.
- 13. In any case, the breakdown of Pact personnel by uniform service cannot be estimated with confidence. The arbitrary division of the various sub-elements of national air defense by uniform service are, for the most part, not supported by good intelligence information.
- 14. An alternative presentation of the data which would facilitate functional comparisons with NATO and avoid the estimative uncertainties inherent in the two-category uniformed service format is shown in table 3.
- 15. Such a format, which focuses on the <u>functions</u> of personnel would require rigorous definition of the main functional categories, but would be more flexible (the number of categories could be expanded), more easily understood by both NATO and Pact negotiators and more confidently supported by US intelligence.

<u>Issues</u> and Alternatives for Presenting the New Data to the Allies

16. The new US estimates of Pact ground force and air forces strengths should not cause serious problems with the Allies. The difference in the ground force figure is so small (0.3%) that it may not be worth raising at this time if we continue to use the current



Table 2

Indigenous Warsaw Pact National Air Defense Manpower

Country	National Air Defense	NAD Personnel Listed in Table 1 as Air Force	NAD Personnel Listed in Table 1 as Ground Force
Poland	45,200	18,500	26,700
CSSR	25,700	10,800	14,900
East Germany	22,100	22,100 1/	·
	93,000	51,400	41,600

^{1.} All national air defense personnel in East Germany are in the East German Air and Air Defense Command and, as such, they are considered to be Air Force in the two-service categorization.

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Warsaw Pact Military Manpower in NGA

Alternative Functional Categorization

	Ground Forces	National Air Defense	Air Forces	Totals
Soviet				
GSFG NGF CGF	360,000 30,000 70,000	N/A N/A N/A	40,800 13,700 5,600	400,800 43,700 75,600
Total*	460,000	<u>N/A</u>	60,100	520,000
Indigenous				
East Germany Poland CSSR	90,400 192,400 143,000	22,100 45,200 25,700	16,200 42,000 32,100	128,700 279,600 200,800
Total*	426,000	93,000	90,300	609,000
Total Pact*	886,000	93,000	150,000	1,130,000

^{*} These totals have been rounded to three significant figures.

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data categories with the Allies and the East. The new air force totals present a greater problem because of the large increase. However, the new US number (202,000) is considerably closer to the 180,000 man estimate which the FRG has recently disclosed than was our previous estimate of 111,500. In any case, we have developed rationales and estimating methods which can be used to support the new estimates in detail without disclosure of sensitive information.

- 17. The main advantage of the functional force categories described in paragraphs 14-15 is that they compare more closely with the categories used in the Pact and are therefore susceptible to more confident intelligence analysis. They are likely to be better understood by the East than would our present categories. But the Allies are not accustomed to thinking of forces in these categories—although Allied intelligence specialists will recognize them—and may resist them. Also, it must be noted that the Pact negotiators have not raised the issue, perhaps because they realize that the current categories tend to encourage undercounting Pact manpower.
- 18. We believe that before any decision could be made on adopting new categories some further analysis of US and Allied forces along functional lines would be necessary. It is not presently clear how the NATO/Pact force ratios would fall out.

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